An analysis of the problem of personal identity

Shoemaker argues that this follows from the functionalist theory of mind, Faced with the prospect of having one of your hemispheres transplanted, there is no evident reason to prefer that the other be destroyed.

A being is psychologically connected, at some future time, with you as you are now just if she is in the psychological states she is in then in large part because of the psychological states you are in now.

For all you could ever know, it seems, you might be the one making this mistake. Sameness and Substance, Oxford: But it seems that the defender of strong Composition as Identity must deny this. The psychological-continuity view as we have stated it implies that any future being who is psychologically continuous with you must be you.

Metaphysics and Semantics, Oxford: It is doubtful, however, that the indeterminacy of personal identity can be exploited selectively, for physiological and psychological continuity relations are equally indeterminate in a particular range of cases cf.

Also, this person may never be able to talk, walk, laugh, or express emotions the same way as I would. The information is sent to a replicator device on Mars, which at t2 creates a qualitatively identical duplicate, Y cf. Stage theorists have to pay a price for this advantage over perdurance theory, however.

Although Parfit affirms the existence of persons, their special ontological status as non-separately-existing substances can be expressed by the claim that persons do not have to be listed separately on an inventory of what exists.

Thus it is debated whether a symmetrical universe is possible, e.

Personal identity

A Reader, Lanham, MD: And the defender of strong pluralism in the material constitution debate i. But, according to the strong Composition as Identity thesis, there can also be true hybrid identity statements that relate pluralities and single objects.

Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism, Cambridge: The persistence question asks, in this case, whether you would still exist. However, though this is perhaps the most natural way to interpret de re modal statements once it has been accepted that the apparatus of possible worlds is to be used as an interpretative toolthere are well-known difficulties that make the approach problematic.

We might start thinking about which features can be changed without changing the underlying self. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that, but two poodles will very likely have greater qualitative identity.

The classical identity relation is one that can only have single objects as relata as in: In this case, it does not seem to be the case that the surgeons transplant the human animal X from one head to another.Criteria of personal identity and the limits of concep-tual analysis Theodore Sider Philosophical Perspectives 15 (): – It is easy to become battle-weary in metaphysics.

In the face of seemingly personal identity you like, there exist space-time worms that obey that criterion. Here, I’ll be discussing the problem of personal ltgov2018.com aim is to offer a brief historical account of the problem touching briefly on bodily identity followed by Hume’s take on it.

The four theories of personal identity—body theory, soul theory, memory theory, brain theory—expressed in Perry’s book are well discussed.

In a general sense, it seems that the body theory wins the round of dialogs for having more pros and fewer cons than the soul, memory, and brain theories.

The aim of this article is to (1) add precision to the problem of personal identity, (2) state a number of theories of personal identity and give arguments for and against them, (3) formulate "the paradox of identity," which proposes to show that posing the persistence question, in conjunction with a number of plausible assumptions, leads to a.

Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time, but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have also attracted attention.

Personal Identity: Who are you? What am I?

Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time, but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have also attracted attention.

Download
An analysis of the problem of personal identity
Rated 5/5 based on 4 review